<p>Consequentialism is a normative theory of moral good and right grounded on the consequences of actions. The classical taxonomy or classification of consequentialism is positive and negative, but ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ demand clarification for meaningful use. And it is metaethically important to clarify the meaning of positive and negative in positive and negative consequentialism. Generally, ‘positive’ refers to the vector of moral enterprise as primarily promoting good and, in some cases, maximizing it minus evil. However, the vector in negative consequentialism is to minimize the evil of suffering with primacy. It is important to note that negative consequentialism in the contemporary normative ethical parlance is termed suffering-focused consequentialism, also known as negative utilitarianism or disutilitarianism. However, ‘negative utilitarianism’ and ‘disutilitarianism’ need cogent explanations for meaningful use. Furthermore, the taxonomy or classification of suffering-focused consequentialism into absolute or strict, and strong, is problematic, for being equanimous. Hence, it is metaethically problematic to scrutinize the meaning of strict and strong disutilitarianism, and the logical congruence of the taxonomy. Another metaethical problem is the justification of suffering-focused consequentialism, particularly the asymmetric justification based on pleasure–pain asymmetry. The three sections of this paper inquire into these metaethical problems of clarifying the language used in suffering-focused consequentialism, to suggest reasons for classifying consequentialism as pluralistic and monistic, and to understand the fallacies in asymmetric justification of suffering-focused consequentialism. Significantly, metaethical enterprises enable a better understanding of moral vocabulary, classification, and justification in negative consequentialism.</p>