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<p>John Campbell, in his influential work&#xa0;(<i>Reference and Consciousness</i>, Oxford University Press, 2002), advocates the Relational View of Perception. On&#xa0;this view, perceptual experience must fulfill an epistemic function in enabling reference to or acquiring knowledge about the mind-independent objects and their properties. It asserts that in perception, we epistemically gain (or lack) <i>nothing</i> other than the knowledge of the properties of mind-independent objects. Moreover, to accelerate the epistemic role of perceptual experience&#xa0;the relational view supports&#xa0;rejecting Qualia-Realism and Intentionalism. This paper reflects on Campbell’s relational view of perception, emphasizing the epistemic role of perceptual experience. In opposition to the relational view, the paper promotes the idea that in perception, we gain knowledge other than the properties of mind-independent objects. It then contends that while the rejection of qualia-realism and intentionalism is a deliberate theoretical choice, it may lead to inappropriate consequences for the relational view.</p>

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On the Epistemic Role of Perceptual Experience: Some Challenges to Campbell’s Relational View of Perception

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年6月3日

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  • S. Sreenish

摘要

John Campbell, in his influential work (Reference and Consciousness, Oxford University Press, 2002), advocates the Relational View of Perception. On this view, perceptual experience must fulfill an epistemic function in enabling reference to or acquiring knowledge about the mind-independent objects and their properties. It asserts that in perception, we epistemically gain (or lack) nothing other than the knowledge of the properties of mind-independent objects. Moreover, to accelerate the epistemic role of perceptual experience the relational view supports rejecting Qualia-Realism and Intentionalism. This paper reflects on Campbell’s relational view of perception, emphasizing the epistemic role of perceptual experience. In opposition to the relational view, the paper promotes the idea that in perception, we gain knowledge other than the properties of mind-independent objects. It then contends that while the rejection of qualia-realism and intentionalism is a deliberate theoretical choice, it may lead to inappropriate consequences for the relational view.