<p>The paper is another contemplation, among others, on the possible theory of justice. It begins with an inquiry on the question, of what truly opposes the general conception of the idea of justice. Beginning with the principle of ‘opposite’ is always dreadful until there is some clarity on what it opposes. Therefore, we began with the ‘actions’ that compel a moral man to term it as an ‘unjust act’. Our attempt leads us to conclude that injustice is another name for the state of indifference, indifference towards ‘something’ which will be dealt with in detail. These findings again will be the premise for our next inference where we attempt to conclude that <i>justice</i> is the name given to the moral sentiments, or moral awareness, that dwells within the one that deals with the ‘situation’ so as to transcend ‘it’—the situation—in a fair way, in the form of a decision.</p>