On Skepticism: Wittgenstein Versus Moore
摘要
The problem of skepticism has been the most intractable problem in epistemology. It is also concerned with the problem of certainty in human knowledge. In this paper, an attempt is made to examine how both Wittgenstein and G.E. Moore tackle the problem of certainty and skepticism in epistemology. There is a common agenda between Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and G.E. Moore’s “A Defense of Common Sense’’. Both deal with the problem of certainty and refutation of skepticism. Moore dismisses skepticism concerning the outer world on the basis of commonsense. Wittgenstein situates certainty in the grammar of language itself. He agrees neither with Moore nor with the skeptic. It would be proper to describe him as the advocator of the grammatical model; Certainty is inherent in the grammar of language.