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<p>In this paper, we aim to identify the conditions for the dominant strategy rationalization of collective choice outcomes. We focus on simultaneous move complete information games with a finite number of players. In this regard, we introduce two independent axioms and show that they are necessary and sufficient for dominant strategy rationalization. It turns out that these Axioms are similar to two well-known Axioms-Sen’s Alpha and Arrow’s Axiom.</p>

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Dominant Strategy Rationalization of Collective Choice Outcomes

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年2月12日

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  • Keshav Sureka,
  • Debabrata Pal

摘要

In this paper, we aim to identify the conditions for the dominant strategy rationalization of collective choice outcomes. We focus on simultaneous move complete information games with a finite number of players. In this regard, we introduce two independent axioms and show that they are necessary and sufficient for dominant strategy rationalization. It turns out that these Axioms are similar to two well-known Axioms-Sen’s Alpha and Arrow’s Axiom.