Carbon Tax in a Triopoly with Environmental R&D and Knowledge Spillovers
摘要
In a three-stage game-theoretic framework, we build a triopoly model characterized by environmental research and development (R&D) and knowledge spillovers. This study analyzes the effects and implications of environmental technology policies on a polluting triopoly with environmental R&D and knowledge spillovers. In particular, we (i) compare the economic–environmental performance of regimes of R&D competition, R&D partial cartelization, and R&D full cartelization under non-commitment and commitment scenarios; (ii) examine stability conditions between insiders and an outsider in R&D partial cartelization under non-commitment and commitment scenarios; and (iii) investigate the full rank of the firm- and industrial-level variables under different cases. This study provides practical insights into the optimal design of environmental technology policies for government, enterprises, and consumers under a unified analysis framework.