<p>This article continues the dialogue with Pat Werhane, responding to her “Embedding Means and Ends: A Response to David Wilson.” First, I address her discussion of social constructionism. Because she agrees that teleology is essential to leadership—though she did not mention it, assuming it could be taken for granted—I argue that we share the same concept of leadership. Our disagreement, I suggest, arises because she offers a model of leadership that she believes universally preferable, whereas I am not proposing a model at all. Rather, I aim to clarify the concept of leadership in a way that leaves room for multiple models suited to different circumstances. Second, I argue that my account is not distinctively Western, and that I agree with her in rejecting the claim that followers are conceptually necessary for leadership. Third, I take up the “Hitler problem,” contending that if leadership is understood as a functional role, then Hitler was indeed a leader—but a catastrophically bad one. To those who object that “leadership” often implies <i>good</i> leadership, I reply that this is a case of the common phenomenon of linguistic ellipsis: the evaluative qualifier is omitted when it is conversationally implied. At the same time, I formulate a more challenging version of the Hitler problem. Finally, I acknowledge that I overstated her reliance on naturalism, though I argue that without it her commitment to self-organization lacks what may be its strongest theoretical support.</p>

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The Hitler Problem, the Follower Problem, and the Concept of Leadership

  • David Carl Wilson

摘要

This article continues the dialogue with Pat Werhane, responding to her “Embedding Means and Ends: A Response to David Wilson.” First, I address her discussion of social constructionism. Because she agrees that teleology is essential to leadership—though she did not mention it, assuming it could be taken for granted—I argue that we share the same concept of leadership. Our disagreement, I suggest, arises because she offers a model of leadership that she believes universally preferable, whereas I am not proposing a model at all. Rather, I aim to clarify the concept of leadership in a way that leaves room for multiple models suited to different circumstances. Second, I argue that my account is not distinctively Western, and that I agree with her in rejecting the claim that followers are conceptually necessary for leadership. Third, I take up the “Hitler problem,” contending that if leadership is understood as a functional role, then Hitler was indeed a leader—but a catastrophically bad one. To those who object that “leadership” often implies good leadership, I reply that this is a case of the common phenomenon of linguistic ellipsis: the evaluative qualifier is omitted when it is conversationally implied. At the same time, I formulate a more challenging version of the Hitler problem. Finally, I acknowledge that I overstated her reliance on naturalism, though I argue that without it her commitment to self-organization lacks what may be its strongest theoretical support.