<p>This study is based on the Chinese context and investigates the strategic timing behavior of listed company managers in holding online earnings communication conferences (OECCs), as well as the motivations and economic consequences underlying this behavior. The results show that the better the performance of listed companies, the more likely managers are to convene OECCs during trading hours, suggesting that these conferences are strategically timed. This phenomenon is more pronounced in companies with more earnings management and weakens in companies with better internal control quality or stronger manager capabilities. Furthermore, attracting investor attention, increasing stock liquidity, and realizing appreciation in the value of stock holdings are the motivations behind managers’ timing of OECCs. Finally, the timing of OECCs can lead to more investor attention and stock liquidity, induce more insider trading, and generate a positive market reaction in the short term. However, it will increase stock price volatility and even crash risk in the medium to long term. This study presents new evidence on managers’ timing behavior, providing a reference for regulators to further improve the system of investor relations management.</p>