<p>This article presents an empirical investigation into civil litigation against securities informational misconduct in China. Employing a text-mining algorithm, we extract data from various disclosure sources of Chinese listed companies to construct a near-universe sample of first-instance litigation cases initiated by harmed investors against non-financial listed companies for misrepresentation between 2002 and 2023. Our analysis reveals that the number of private securities litigation cases, along with the claimed and awarded damages, increased most significantly following China’s 2015 judicial reform of case registration and 2019 revision of the Securities Law. With respect to the ‘piggyback effect’ between public and private enforcement, the likelihood of administratively sanctioned listed companies facing subsequent civil litigation also increased substantially over the sample period. Finally, our examination of litigation determinants reveals that the gravity of informational misconduct, proxied by the duration of administrative proceedings, is positively correlated with the likelihood of civil litigation initiation.</p>

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Uncovering Hidden Civil Litigation Against Securities Informational Misconduct in China: Empirical Evidence from Announcements Made by Listed Companies

  • Wenming Xu

摘要

This article presents an empirical investigation into civil litigation against securities informational misconduct in China. Employing a text-mining algorithm, we extract data from various disclosure sources of Chinese listed companies to construct a near-universe sample of first-instance litigation cases initiated by harmed investors against non-financial listed companies for misrepresentation between 2002 and 2023. Our analysis reveals that the number of private securities litigation cases, along with the claimed and awarded damages, increased most significantly following China’s 2015 judicial reform of case registration and 2019 revision of the Securities Law. With respect to the ‘piggyback effect’ between public and private enforcement, the likelihood of administratively sanctioned listed companies facing subsequent civil litigation also increased substantially over the sample period. Finally, our examination of litigation determinants reveals that the gravity of informational misconduct, proxied by the duration of administrative proceedings, is positively correlated with the likelihood of civil litigation initiation.