<p>Corporate short-termism, i.e., corporations sacrificing long-term value for short-term profits, has received considerable attention in the corporate governance literature. However, the role of controlling shareholders in the short-termism debate has remained understudied, possibly because of the predominant focus on the United States and the United Kingdom governance systems. This paper addresses this by comprehensively analyzing the impact of controlling shareholders on the short-termism problem. Two conceptual hypotheses of short-termism are presented: one in which short-termism originates with institutional investors, and one in which it originates with managers and directors. The paper then shows how controlling shareholders can eliminate short-termism in both hypotheses, but only if controlling shareholders themselves are not excessively short-term oriented, which depends on the type of controlling shareholder. The paper concludes with several policy implications, including with regard to loyalty voting rights and dual-class share structures.</p>