<p>The 2016 judicial vetting reform in Albania represents one the most far-reaching models of vetting as a re-evaluation mechanism for sitting judges and prosecutors. Judicial vetting was embedded on a comprehensive constitutional reform which aimed at improving public trust in the judiciary and strengthening the rule of law. The reform reorganized the judiciary, created new self-governing judicial institutions, set up the Special Prosecution Office against Corruption and Organized Crime (SPAK) and introduced the re-evaluation process of judges and prosecutors. Judicial vetting has become a frequently employed tool – although at different degrees – in several pre-accession countries such as Albania, Moldova, Ukraine, Serbia. This increased interest in judicial vetting invites reflections on its appropriateness as a tool to strengthen accountability and integrity in the judiciary within the confines of rule of law guarantees. This article argues that the way in which vetting was implemented in Albania has undermined the full compliance of the process with components of the rule of law such as judicial independence and fair trial rights. In addition, effects of the reform such as a high backlog of cases, high number of vacancies throughout the judiciary have undermined effective judicial protection and access to courts.</p>