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<p>In this expository article, we give an overview of the concept of potential mean field games of first order. We give a new proof that minimizers of the potential are equilibria by using a Lagrangian formulation. We also provide criteria to determine whether or not a game has a potential. Finally, we discuss in some depth the selection problem in mean field games, which consists in choosing one out of multiple Nash equilibria.</p>

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Remarks on potential mean field games

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年2月7日

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  • P. Jameson Graber

摘要

In this expository article, we give an overview of the concept of potential mean field games of first order. We give a new proof that minimizers of the potential are equilibria by using a Lagrangian formulation. We also provide criteria to determine whether or not a game has a potential. Finally, we discuss in some depth the selection problem in mean field games, which consists in choosing one out of multiple Nash equilibria.