Scholarlink

<p>Gabriel Andrade’s recent article, published in <i>Monash Bioethics Review</i>, employs a <i>modus tollens</i> argument to claim that abortion cannot be murder by contending that, if it were, violent resistance (e.g. bombing abortion clinics) would be justified under Just War theory. Because such violence is widely condemned, he concludes that abortion is not murder. This paper critically examines the underlying ethical and legal assumptions of that argument. By interrogating the premises related to Just War theory, and supplementing the critique with counter-<i>modus tollens</i> arguments derived from contemporary foetal homicide statutes and the concept of conditional moral status, this paper demonstrates that reducing the moral status of abortion to the permissibility or impermissibility of violence is both conceptually and practically flawed. This paper calls for an ethical framework that respects legal consistency, competing rights claims, and the importance of procedural restraint in resolving bioethical challenges.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

Modus tollens and the epistemic limits of moral intuition in bioethical reasoning: a response to Gabriel Andrade

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年3月26日

查看全文
  • Johnny Sakr

摘要

Gabriel Andrade’s recent article, published in Monash Bioethics Review, employs a modus tollens argument to claim that abortion cannot be murder by contending that, if it were, violent resistance (e.g. bombing abortion clinics) would be justified under Just War theory. Because such violence is widely condemned, he concludes that abortion is not murder. This paper critically examines the underlying ethical and legal assumptions of that argument. By interrogating the premises related to Just War theory, and supplementing the critique with counter-modus tollens arguments derived from contemporary foetal homicide statutes and the concept of conditional moral status, this paper demonstrates that reducing the moral status of abortion to the permissibility or impermissibility of violence is both conceptually and practically flawed. This paper calls for an ethical framework that respects legal consistency, competing rights claims, and the importance of procedural restraint in resolving bioethical challenges.