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<p>Lovo and Spaenjers (Econ Lett 156:142–144, 2017) proved that no trade occurs in all equilibria of a second-price auction with a secret reserve price and an entry cost, since no buyer types enter the auction. They assume buyers bid truthfully, which is the unique equilibrium bidding strategy with a positive reserve and at least three buyers. We show that this result does not encompass the case of exactly two buyers, where equilibria with entry and trade may exist when buyers follow non-truthful bidding strategies.</p>

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On the existence of equilibria with entry and trade in second-price auctions with a secret reserve price

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年4月15日

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  • David Lander,
  • Keer Li

摘要

Lovo and Spaenjers (Econ Lett 156:142–144, 2017) proved that no trade occurs in all equilibria of a second-price auction with a secret reserve price and an entry cost, since no buyer types enter the auction. They assume buyers bid truthfully, which is the unique equilibrium bidding strategy with a positive reserve and at least three buyers. We show that this result does not encompass the case of exactly two buyers, where equilibria with entry and trade may exist when buyers follow non-truthful bidding strategies.