<p>This study incorporates reciprocal preferences into a blockchain-enabled traceability goodwill (BTG) supply chain. We use a Stackelberg differential game to analyze the dynamic decision-making of supply chain members and coordination mechanisms, in which a manufacturer is positioned as the leader and two competitive retailers as followers. We first construct five different modes: decentralized decision-making mode (Scenario <i>D</i>), centralized decision-making mode (Scenario <i>C</i>), smart cost-sharing contract mode (Scenario <i>S</i>), smart cost-sharing contract with the manufacturer’s altruistic preference mode (Scenario <i>E</i>), and smart cost-sharing contract with reciprocal preferences mode (Scenario <i>P</i>). And then, we compare and evaluate the optimum strategies across these scenarios. Furthermore, we define the rates of consumer trust and analyze the reference significance of reciprocal preferences for the credibility of blockchain traceability. The results show that the steady-state BTG is determined by the optimal interplay between the blockchain investment and the traceability promotional efforts. While the entire supply chain profit is enhanced by a smart cost-sharing contract, the retailers may suffer losses. Interestingly, consumer trust in blockchain-enabled traceability is weakened by the manufacturer’s altruistic behavior without an improvement in the entire supply chain profit. Conversely, reciprocal preferences among the retailers foster the long-term cooperation of the supply chain and strengthen the credibility of blockchain technology.</p>