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<p><?tk 2?>Proponents of the idea of basal cognition clash with those seeking to restrict the term “cognitive” to systems showing human-like capacities. The impasse over the definition of cognition is unlikely to end soon, but it will surely be helpful to get clearer on what it is about certain things that makes them indisputably noncognitive. Do the arguments for basal cognition inevitably devolve into claims for a kind of panpsychism, or is there a principled standard for what counts as indisputably noncognitive that all parties will adhere to? This article offers a mark of the noncognitive—it characterizes what it is about certain entities and processes that makes them paradigmatically noncognitive. The characterization is not a novel proposal but a clarification of a rare, though implicit, point of consensus in the cognition wars. I argue that opinion converges on the notion of noncognitive processes being those that appear to be the result only of proximal, efficient physical-chemical causes. A system whose activity profile is of this sort will be a <i>simple mechanism</i> and have the passive and inflexible character that is paradigmatically noncognitive. I end the article with a discussion of the metaphysical background. On most understandings of <i>physicalism</i>, including one adhered to by proponents of basal cognition, all properties, processes, and entities are fundamentally noncognitive or nonmental. This means that the claims for basal cognition are less radical than those proponents typically promise. I discuss a neo-Aristotelian ontology which would enable such claims to become metaphysically substantive.</p>

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A Mark of the Noncognitive

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年7月21日

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  • M. Chirimuuta

摘要

Proponents of the idea of basal cognition clash with those seeking to restrict the term “cognitive” to systems showing human-like capacities. The impasse over the definition of cognition is unlikely to end soon, but it will surely be helpful to get clearer on what it is about certain things that makes them indisputably noncognitive. Do the arguments for basal cognition inevitably devolve into claims for a kind of panpsychism, or is there a principled standard for what counts as indisputably noncognitive that all parties will adhere to? This article offers a mark of the noncognitive—it characterizes what it is about certain entities and processes that makes them paradigmatically noncognitive. The characterization is not a novel proposal but a clarification of a rare, though implicit, point of consensus in the cognition wars. I argue that opinion converges on the notion of noncognitive processes being those that appear to be the result only of proximal, efficient physical-chemical causes. A system whose activity profile is of this sort will be a simple mechanism and have the passive and inflexible character that is paradigmatically noncognitive. I end the article with a discussion of the metaphysical background. On most understandings of physicalism, including one adhered to by proponents of basal cognition, all properties, processes, and entities are fundamentally noncognitive or nonmental. This means that the claims for basal cognition are less radical than those proponents typically promise. I discuss a neo-Aristotelian ontology which would enable such claims to become metaphysically substantive.