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<p>Under the carbon peaking and carbon neutrality goals, the new energy industry has emerged as a new engine for China’s economic development. Establishing a collaborative innovation system serves as a critical pathway to accelerate the growth of strategic emerging industries such as new energy. Critical minerals represented by nickel ore play an essential role as raw materials in advancing the new energy sector. This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, nickel mining enterprises, and new energy enterprises from a systems perspective. It analyzes behavioral choices and equilibrium states during collaborative innovation processes and simulates the evolution of interactions among these stakeholders. The research reveals two evolutionary equilibrium points in this collaborative innovation system. The initial willingness of participating entities significantly influences the system’s convergence speed toward stability—higher initial willingness accelerates this process. Furthermore, reducing government supervision costs, reasonably increasing financial support, enhancing enterprises’ excess returns, and appropriately lowering information platform construction costs collectively foster the development of this collaborative innovation system.</p>

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Research on collaborative innovation mechanism of new energy enterprises based on tripartite evolutionary game theory

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

    开放获取

  • 发表日期：

    2026年1月20日

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  • Haoxi Zhang,
  • Jinhua Cheng,
  • Jingyuan Li,
  • Na Zhou

摘要

Under the carbon peaking and carbon neutrality goals, the new energy industry has emerged as a new engine for China’s economic development. Establishing a collaborative innovation system serves as a critical pathway to accelerate the growth of strategic emerging industries such as new energy. Critical minerals represented by nickel ore play an essential role as raw materials in advancing the new energy sector. This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, nickel mining enterprises, and new energy enterprises from a systems perspective. It analyzes behavioral choices and equilibrium states during collaborative innovation processes and simulates the evolution of interactions among these stakeholders. The research reveals two evolutionary equilibrium points in this collaborative innovation system. The initial willingness of participating entities significantly influences the system’s convergence speed toward stability—higher initial willingness accelerates this process. Furthermore, reducing government supervision costs, reasonably increasing financial support, enhancing enterprises’ excess returns, and appropriately lowering information platform construction costs collectively foster the development of this collaborative innovation system.