<p>System configuration profoundly affects the performance of low–high-gain control, which enables control synthesis to deal with various constraints (e.g., actuation saturation and bounded time delay). Increasing investments in physical configuration can improve control performance with an accelerated convergence rate. However, denial of service (DoS) attacks disorder the configuration and degrade the performance by blocking communications. This paper proposes an optimized allocation scheme of actuation range (AR) to improve the resilience of low–high-gain control against DoS attacks. The quantitative relationships between AR, control performance, and DoS attacks are theoretically analyzed. The analysis formulates the impact of DoS attacks on actuation errors under zeroing, zero-order-hold, and data-compensation-based actuation strategies in attack time within the specified AR and attack intensity. Minimizing the ultimate upper bound of the system state derives the optimized AR according to the relationships. Both theoretical analysis and experimental results indicate that enlarging AR cannot constantly improve the performance of low–high-gain control under DoS attacks. The sub-optimality exists with a performance guarantee for a specified attack intensity. Moreover, the experimental results of grid frequency control suggest to choose a conservative AR under intensive attacks to prevent further control performance degradation.</p>

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Optimized Actuation Ranges of Low–high-gain Control for Relieving Performance Degradation under DoS Attacks

  • Qiuzhuo Liu,
  • Jian Sun,
  • Wenfeng Li,
  • Shanwen Tan,
  • Xin Song

摘要

System configuration profoundly affects the performance of low–high-gain control, which enables control synthesis to deal with various constraints (e.g., actuation saturation and bounded time delay). Increasing investments in physical configuration can improve control performance with an accelerated convergence rate. However, denial of service (DoS) attacks disorder the configuration and degrade the performance by blocking communications. This paper proposes an optimized allocation scheme of actuation range (AR) to improve the resilience of low–high-gain control against DoS attacks. The quantitative relationships between AR, control performance, and DoS attacks are theoretically analyzed. The analysis formulates the impact of DoS attacks on actuation errors under zeroing, zero-order-hold, and data-compensation-based actuation strategies in attack time within the specified AR and attack intensity. Minimizing the ultimate upper bound of the system state derives the optimized AR according to the relationships. Both theoretical analysis and experimental results indicate that enlarging AR cannot constantly improve the performance of low–high-gain control under DoS attacks. The sub-optimality exists with a performance guarantee for a specified attack intensity. Moreover, the experimental results of grid frequency control suggest to choose a conservative AR under intensive attacks to prevent further control performance degradation.