<p>This response clarifies the relationship between the Diamond Model’s valves and Benjamin Gregg’s proposal of militant pragmatism. I argue that the valves are not design-only recommendations and are not intended to substitute for litigation, regulation, antitrust, or labor organizing. Rather, they specify where constraints must become enforceable as AI outputs harden into binding decisions, so contestation can occur early enough to prevent lock-in from turning oversight into retrofitting. The commentary usefully foregrounds institutional counter-power and names practical implementation pathways. I show how adversarial litigation, bright-line bans, antitrust and interoperability, and labor organizing can function as routes for making valve duties binding. At the same time, I emphasize that enforcement capacity varies across jurisdictions, and that without shared political intelligibility about infrastructural closure, institutional tools often activate too late or yield shallow compliance. Finally, I frame closure as a recurrent tendency rather than a destiny and argue that mapping closures helps convert fractures and resistance into durable constraints.</p>