Through consequentialist reasoning, Sass (2025) offers an insightful response that challenges my argument for human decision-making involving duty-right relationships, arguing that algorithmic decision-making may do a better job at optimizing outcomes beyond efficiency and accuracy, namely human-centric values like fairness and compassion. He also suggests that the humanistic motivation of my account can be supported by human-centred communication, rather than human discretion over decision processes. I respond that this misconstrues the importance of human decision-making, i.e., ensuring a shared humanity between decision-makers and those affected when constrained by duties and correlative rights understood as the moral law. This is not to bring about more fair or compassionate decisions, but is primordially important insofar as this shared humanity is a necessary condition for these moral relationships. I show this by restating my argument as transcendental. I conclude with practical implications, where algorithmically-assisted decision-making remains morally sound, yet human-centred communication in the absence of human discretion over decision processes is relegated to tasks that do not involve directed duties and their correlative rights.
