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<p>We model a conflict between an existing power and an emerging power as a strategic dynamic game with a Markov chain that regulates the emerging power’s strength evolution. Whichever country is relatively stronger in a given period has an option to declare war on the other side: once the emerging power reaches a certain strength level, it can choose to attack the existing power, but until then, initiating an attack is an option only for the existing power. The main question we address here is under which conditions the equilibrium behavior coincides with <i>the Thucydides trap</i>—a&#xa0;phenomenon in which the existing power chooses to declare war so as to prevent a future war that will start on the emerging power’s terms (i.e., under less favorable conditions for the existing power). We characterize the unique stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium involving the case of the Thucydides trap. The equilibrium conditions highlight the importance of two sets of parameters: the possible strength levels for the emerging power and the Markov probabilities that govern the transition between those strength levels. Our comparative static analyses provide economically intuitive results.</p>

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A Game-theoretic Investigation of the Thucydides Trap

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年5月23日

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  • Emin Karagözoğlu,
  • Kerim Keskin,
  • Çağrı Sağlam

摘要

We model a conflict between an existing power and an emerging power as a strategic dynamic game with a Markov chain that regulates the emerging power’s strength evolution. Whichever country is relatively stronger in a given period has an option to declare war on the other side: once the emerging power reaches a certain strength level, it can choose to attack the existing power, but until then, initiating an attack is an option only for the existing power. The main question we address here is under which conditions the equilibrium behavior coincides with the Thucydides trap—a phenomenon in which the existing power chooses to declare war so as to prevent a future war that will start on the emerging power’s terms (i.e., under less favorable conditions for the existing power). We characterize the unique stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium involving the case of the Thucydides trap. The equilibrium conditions highlight the importance of two sets of parameters: the possible strength levels for the emerging power and the Markov probabilities that govern the transition between those strength levels. Our comparative static analyses provide economically intuitive results.