Scholarlink

<p>In this study, to show the conditions for stochastic evolutionary stability in evolutionary game dynamics with more than two pure strategies, the results from two-phenotype models with two pure strategies are extended to the situation with three pure strategies. Our main results enrich our understanding of the stochastic evolutionary stability in situations with multiple pure strategies. In particular, it should be noted that the mathematical complexity in determining the conditions for stochastic evolutionary stability, especially for the degenerate cases with multiple pure strategies, should be given a great attention in the future study.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

Stochastic Evolutionary Stability in Matrix Game with Three Pure Strategies Models

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年1月27日

查看全文
  • Xiu-Deng Zheng,
  • Yi Tao,
  • Cong Li

摘要

In this study, to show the conditions for stochastic evolutionary stability in evolutionary game dynamics with more than two pure strategies, the results from two-phenotype models with two pure strategies are extended to the situation with three pure strategies. Our main results enrich our understanding of the stochastic evolutionary stability in situations with multiple pure strategies. In particular, it should be noted that the mathematical complexity in determining the conditions for stochastic evolutionary stability, especially for the degenerate cases with multiple pure strategies, should be given a great attention in the future study.