Recently, Baron and Le Bihan (2023) have suggested revisiting the causal theory of spacetime, noting that advancements in physics, particularly causal set theory, and metaphysics offer new counters to the criticisms of Smart (1969) and Earman (1972)—criticisms that, they say, defeated the original causal theory of spacetime. Baron and Le Bihan propose that, while the traditional identity causal theory, which seeks to equate spacetime relations with causal relations, is still inadequate, a revised approach could succeed if identity is replaced by grounding and if the grounding base is that of causal set theory. This non-identity causal theory of spacetime posits, in other words, that spatiotemporal relations are grounded in the fundamental causal relations associated with causal sets—in alleged line with the original aim of understanding spacetime through causality. In this paper, we argue that the new arguments put forward by Baron and Le Bihan do little to meet the challenges of Smart and Earman with the result that their non-identity theory does not fare better in addressing these original criticisms than the identity theory. To this end, we will demonstrate that their new arguments make assumptions that (1) are not shared in these historical criticisms of causal theories of spacetime, and, at the same time, (2) are either indecisive or false. Furthermore, we argue that, even with these assumptions, the identity theory can still do just as well as the non-identity theory.
