<p>We argue that the concept of signatures, which is prominently used in particle physics measurements, represents an important complement to phenomena. We critically discuss two prominent philosophical assessments of phenomena in particle physics, to wit, those of neutral currents by Bogen-Woodward and the <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <InlineMediaObject> <ImageObject Color="BlackWhite" FileRef="13194_2025_661_Article_IEq1.gif" Format="GIF" Height="19" Rendition="HTML" Resolution="72" Type="Linedraw" Width="34" /> </InlineMediaObject> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(J/\psi \)</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"><math> <mrow> <mi>J</mi> <mo stretchy="false">/</mo> <mi>ψ</mi> </mrow> </math></EquationSource> </InlineEquation> and Higgs boson by Massimi. While the mentioned phenomena are inferred by combining separate measurements and need to be conceptualized, we argue that signatures <i>qua measurement</i> represent stable objects of scientific practice that only contain minimal theoretical assumptions. We subsequently provide a general definition of signature. By considering phenomena and signatures as steps of experimental inquiry, we conclude that, signatures are the final step of the measurement process and phenomena are the first step in the theoretical interpretation. We discuss how they differ from other frequently used philosophical concepts, among them data models and Leonelli’s relational data. Finally, we provide examples for signatures in other disciplines that suggest that signatures can be broadly used to understand scientific measurements.</p>

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Phenomena and signatures

  • Peter Mättig,
  • Michael Stöltzner

摘要

We argue that the concept of signatures, which is prominently used in particle physics measurements, represents an important complement to phenomena. We critically discuss two prominent philosophical assessments of phenomena in particle physics, to wit, those of neutral currents by Bogen-Woodward and the \(J/\psi \) J / ψ and Higgs boson by Massimi. While the mentioned phenomena are inferred by combining separate measurements and need to be conceptualized, we argue that signatures qua measurement represent stable objects of scientific practice that only contain minimal theoretical assumptions. We subsequently provide a general definition of signature. By considering phenomena and signatures as steps of experimental inquiry, we conclude that, signatures are the final step of the measurement process and phenomena are the first step in the theoretical interpretation. We discuss how they differ from other frequently used philosophical concepts, among them data models and Leonelli’s relational data. Finally, we provide examples for signatures in other disciplines that suggest that signatures can be broadly used to understand scientific measurements.