<p>Most research in experimental metaethics suggests high levels of interpersonal and intrapersonal variation in support for moral realism and antirealism among nonphilosophers (i.e., people without significant training in philosophy). These findings challenge the assumption that nonphilosophers share a uniform commitment to moral realism. Recent evidence challenges the validity of these studies by demonstrating that many people do not interpret questions about metaethics as intended. Pölzler and Wright offer a potential solution: train participants to understand the relevant metaethical distinctions. They devised a set of paradigms that feature training exercises, comprehensive instructions, and detailed response options designed to mitigate unintended interpretations. I argue that their efforts were inadequate, and that the training required to ensure participants interpret stimuli as intended would need to be so extensive that it would effectively transform participants into novice philosophers. This leads to a dilemma: if training is unable to ensure adequate rates of intended interpretation, then it can’t resolve the threat to validity it was designed to address, while if it succeeds, participants will no longer represent nonphilosophers, which undermines the study’s external validity. Since research on other philosophical topics may likewise suffer from low rates of intended interpretations, e.g., free will and consciousness, this dilemma may have broader implications for experimental philosophy and psychology.</p>