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<p>The <i>sense of agency</i> is the experience of predicting, initiating, or controlling actions. In this paper, I provide a novel account of the sense of agency that appears in perceptual consciousness. I follow theorists such as Bayne and Prinz in suggesting that the <i>perceptual sense of agency</i> (PSoA) is underpinned by self-monitoring processes. The self-monitoring mechanism compares sensory predictions, made on the basis of motor commands, with sensory feedback. This comparison process distinguishes self-caused from other-caused perceptual changes. I argue for a view where the PSoA is not explained by certain contents represented in perceptual experience. Rather, my account models the PSoA as a type of intentional mode that perceivers bear to contents. After defending this view, I respond to objections and contrast my account with others in the literature.</p>

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The Perceptual Sense of Agency

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年11月11日

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  • Gabriel Siegel

摘要

The sense of agency is the experience of predicting, initiating, or controlling actions. In this paper, I provide a novel account of the sense of agency that appears in perceptual consciousness. I follow theorists such as Bayne and Prinz in suggesting that the perceptual sense of agency (PSoA) is underpinned by self-monitoring processes. The self-monitoring mechanism compares sensory predictions, made on the basis of motor commands, with sensory feedback. This comparison process distinguishes self-caused from other-caused perceptual changes. I argue for a view where the PSoA is not explained by certain contents represented in perceptual experience. Rather, my account models the PSoA as a type of intentional mode that perceivers bear to contents. After defending this view, I respond to objections and contrast my account with others in the literature.