Recent efforts to refine the definition of mindfulness have aimed to improve conceptual clarity and psychometric coherence within psychological science. Chems-Maarif et al. (2025) contributed to this aim by proposing a definition centered on present-centred bare awareness across experiential domains, accompanied by an equanimous attitude. This commentary examines the implications of that refinement for theory, practice, and measurement. I argue that the exclusion of memory, attentional regulation, and temporal continuity reflects a conceptual narrowing in which descriptive features of meditative experience come to stand in for the broader psychological capacity of mindfulness. Drawing on cognitive psychology, contemplative science, and empirical findings on working memory and executive control, I suggest that mindfulness is more coherently understood as a temporally extended capacity for the flexible regulation of attention and attentional mode, including both intentional orienting and deliberate non-orientation, in ways that support effective engagement across contexts. This formulation preserves the pragmatic strengths of the refined definition while making explicit the functional commitments presupposed by post-meditative application, developmental change, and psychological measurement. Clarifying the distinction between experience and capacity may help align definitional theory with both cognitive mechanisms and the stable functional roles ascribed to mindfulness across contemplative traditions, without reintroducing doctrinal or sectarian commitments.
