A new clearing mechanism for recognition of the true competitive opportunity of generation fleets in electricity pay-as-bid markets
摘要
Electricity market operators solve security constraint unit commitment problem to schedule all resources and determine market prices daily. However, the formation of unique prices and the efficient clearing mechanism to evaluate the impacts of internal and external constraints of generating units on their accepted power is a challenging issue due to non-convexities in the market clearing optimization model. Evaluating the marginal contribution of the individual units as well as the power plant’s constraints is crucial in the competitive electricity market auction to determine both lost opportunities and market powers. This paper deals with this challenge in the electricity markets with a pay-as-bid pricing mechanism. For this purpose, a novel mathematical method based on duality theories and decomposed dual variables is proposed. We establish favorable optimization theories and extract a series of sensitivity factors to evaluate the marginal share of each constraint on each term of the market’s objective function. The proposed methodology is examined by application to a 3-bus and the IEEE 118-bus test systems, and the validity and efficiency of the model are demonstrated.