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<p>This paper investigates the pricing and greening level (GL) decisions for substitutable products with different GL. Both products are sold through a mutual retailer and produced by environmentally aware duopoly manufacturers under the cap-and-trade policy (CTP). The demand for each product depends on its selling price and green level (GL), while carbon emissions are affected by the GLs of both products. Using one centralized and five decentralized game scenarios in which two manufacturing leaders (ML), two retailer leaders (RL), and one vertical Nash (VN) game, this study examines how various supply chain participants’ power structures affect optimal GL and pricing decisions. A Stackelberg game is used in the vertical direction, and concurrently, a Bertrand game is played between the two horizontal manufacturers. The optimal outcomes of all scenarios are compared in two situations: with and without CTP. Our results establish that, besides enhancing the GLs of the products, CTP also improves the performance of both manufacturers by increasing profits in all scenarios compared to a situation without CTP. Customers may acquire items with greater GLs in retailer leadership situations and VN, but manufacturers make more income in manufacturer leadership situations, out of five-decentralized games. Further, we conduct numerical and sensitivity analyses to validate the results.</p>

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Sustainable competition and cooperation strategies for duopoly manufacturers under cap‑and‑trade policy for various game structures

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年4月11日

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  • Shivendra Kumar Gupta,
  • Vinod Kumar Mishra

摘要

This paper investigates the pricing and greening level (GL) decisions for substitutable products with different GL. Both products are sold through a mutual retailer and produced by environmentally aware duopoly manufacturers under the cap-and-trade policy (CTP). The demand for each product depends on its selling price and green level (GL), while carbon emissions are affected by the GLs of both products. Using one centralized and five decentralized game scenarios in which two manufacturing leaders (ML), two retailer leaders (RL), and one vertical Nash (VN) game, this study examines how various supply chain participants’ power structures affect optimal GL and pricing decisions. A Stackelberg game is used in the vertical direction, and concurrently, a Bertrand game is played between the two horizontal manufacturers. The optimal outcomes of all scenarios are compared in two situations: with and without CTP. Our results establish that, besides enhancing the GLs of the products, CTP also improves the performance of both manufacturers by increasing profits in all scenarios compared to a situation without CTP. Customers may acquire items with greater GLs in retailer leadership situations and VN, but manufacturers make more income in manufacturer leadership situations, out of five-decentralized games. Further, we conduct numerical and sensitivity analyses to validate the results.