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<p>As online health service (OHS) platforms expand, sustaining physician engagement is vital for their effectiveness. Prior research largely assumes that greater reputation uniformly promotes participation, overlooking physicians’ bounded cognitive and temporal resources. Drawing on resource allocation theory (RAT), this study examines how dual reputations (both online and offline) jointly shape engagement in online consultations. Using data from 6548 physicians on a leading Chinese OHS platform, we find an inverted U-shaped effect of online reputation: moderate recognition increases participation, but excessive visibility triggers resource overload and withdrawal. Furthermore, offline reputation (professional title, hospital rank) reduces overall engagement and weakens the motivational value of online recognition, indicating that high-status physicians face greater opportunity costs from offline obligations. These findings reframe reputation as both a motivator and a constraint, extend RAT to digital professional platforms, and inform the design of balanced incentive systems to sustain physician participation in hybrid healthcare environments.</p>

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Construction of doctors’ reputation systems in online health services: The combination of online and offline mechanisms

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年11月4日

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  • Jin Jiang,
  • Yuanyuan Dang,
  • Shanshan Guo,
  • Yuxin Sun,
  • Wenhui Zhou

摘要

As online health service (OHS) platforms expand, sustaining physician engagement is vital for their effectiveness. Prior research largely assumes that greater reputation uniformly promotes participation, overlooking physicians’ bounded cognitive and temporal resources. Drawing on resource allocation theory (RAT), this study examines how dual reputations (both online and offline) jointly shape engagement in online consultations. Using data from 6548 physicians on a leading Chinese OHS platform, we find an inverted U-shaped effect of online reputation: moderate recognition increases participation, but excessive visibility triggers resource overload and withdrawal. Furthermore, offline reputation (professional title, hospital rank) reduces overall engagement and weakens the motivational value of online recognition, indicating that high-status physicians face greater opportunity costs from offline obligations. These findings reframe reputation as both a motivator and a constraint, extend RAT to digital professional platforms, and inform the design of balanced incentive systems to sustain physician participation in hybrid healthcare environments.