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<p>This article examines outsourcing agreements and their impact on irregular migration and compares them with current plans under discussion at both the national and European level, such as return hubs for the repatriation of rejected asylum seekers to third countries. It argues that the “demotivating” effect of such externalization agreements has yet to be empirically substantiated, as these deals misjudge fundamental migration dynamics.</p>

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The Deterrence Illusion: A Comparative Analysis of European and Global Asylum Externalization Agreements

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

    开放获取

  • 发表日期：

    2026年7月8日

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  • Judith Kohlenberger

摘要

This article examines outsourcing agreements and their impact on irregular migration and compares them with current plans under discussion at both the national and European level, such as return hubs for the repatriation of rejected asylum seekers to third countries. It argues that the “demotivating” effect of such externalization agreements has yet to be empirically substantiated, as these deals misjudge fundamental migration dynamics.