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<p>Social robots powered by generative artificial intelligence (AI) are increasingly integrated into various domains of daily life, such as education, nursing care, and entertainment. This integration prompts an important question concerning their moral status: Should we understand them as <i>moral agents</i> or merely as <i>tools</i>? Although understanding social robots as moral agents in a relational way is appealing, it can lead to confusion regarding the attribution of moral responsibility. This paper proposes viewing the moral status of social robots as “props,” drawing on Walton’s fiction theory. This approach allows us to distinguish fictional truths about robots from the real circumstances in which humans produce them. The “props” perspective helps us understand the agency of social robots as a product of human imaginative activities or “games” facilitated by these robots. Thus, we can distinguish between a robot’s agent-like appearance and its moral status—a crucial distinction when attributing moral responsibility. Finally, drawing on this perspective, we emphasize the importance of evaluating social robots ethically in a manner similar to fictional works, rather than through a purely engineering-based approach.</p>

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Social Robots as “props”: A Human-Centric Explanation of Their Moral Agency and Significance

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年1月20日

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  • Takuya Mizukami

摘要

Social robots powered by generative artificial intelligence (AI) are increasingly integrated into various domains of daily life, such as education, nursing care, and entertainment. This integration prompts an important question concerning their moral status: Should we understand them as moral agents or merely as tools? Although understanding social robots as moral agents in a relational way is appealing, it can lead to confusion regarding the attribution of moral responsibility. This paper proposes viewing the moral status of social robots as “props,” drawing on Walton’s fiction theory. This approach allows us to distinguish fictional truths about robots from the real circumstances in which humans produce them. The “props” perspective helps us understand the agency of social robots as a product of human imaginative activities or “games” facilitated by these robots. Thus, we can distinguish between a robot’s agent-like appearance and its moral status—a crucial distinction when attributing moral responsibility. Finally, drawing on this perspective, we emphasize the importance of evaluating social robots ethically in a manner similar to fictional works, rather than through a purely engineering-based approach.