<p>We discuss how artifacts enabled by emotionalized artificial intelligence technologies participate in the modeling of human environments. For this, we develop the so far wanting but promising biosemiotic view on intelligent artifacts. Explaining its affinities with phenomenological and externalist views on cognition that are usual approaches in philosophy of technology, a biosemiotic framework allows thinking of affect as scaffolded through artifacts. Particularly, the biosemiotic view on evolution and emergence can contribute to current debates on technology by offering solid foundation to the idea that thought is independent of consciousness. This perspective implies a notion of affect as situated, contending that emotional conflict is critical for (human) development. As such, this theoretical approach offers a sharp criticism to developments in emotionalized artificial technology, without embracing technoscepticism. Rather, criticism is directed at the neoliberal ideology of <i>optimization</i>, understood as the reduction of affectivity, which drives technological production. We exemplify by discussing how managerial and companionship AI are coopted in human modeling.</p>

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Suturing Biological and Technical Systems: Situated Affect in the Age of Cognitive Artifacts

  • Peter Mantello,
  • Alin Olteanu

摘要

We discuss how artifacts enabled by emotionalized artificial intelligence technologies participate in the modeling of human environments. For this, we develop the so far wanting but promising biosemiotic view on intelligent artifacts. Explaining its affinities with phenomenological and externalist views on cognition that are usual approaches in philosophy of technology, a biosemiotic framework allows thinking of affect as scaffolded through artifacts. Particularly, the biosemiotic view on evolution and emergence can contribute to current debates on technology by offering solid foundation to the idea that thought is independent of consciousness. This perspective implies a notion of affect as situated, contending that emotional conflict is critical for (human) development. As such, this theoretical approach offers a sharp criticism to developments in emotionalized artificial technology, without embracing technoscepticism. Rather, criticism is directed at the neoliberal ideology of optimization, understood as the reduction of affectivity, which drives technological production. We exemplify by discussing how managerial and companionship AI are coopted in human modeling.