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<p>Stable democracies seem to be characterized less by strong democratic institutions than by the ability of their elected governments to control political discourse and conduct political debates on the basis of science-based information. This puts the question of the role of informational lobbying as a&#xa0;strategic transfer of expertise at the center of analyses of political processes. In this context, this paper uses an Exponential Random Graph approach to analyse the importance of structural network properties as well as characteristic properties of stakeholder organizations as relevant determinants of the network-generating process using the example of German animal welfare policy. The results show that informational lobbying is a&#xa0;relevant channel of influence in German animal welfare policy that exhibits asymmetric influence structures in favor of traditional agricultural associations. These structures are mainly influenced by reciprocity and the embedding of information exchange in a&#xa0;long-term social relationship. Interestingly, they nevertheless lead to the formation of consensus rather than conflict in animal welfare policy.</p>

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Macht Wissen Politik? Muster und Determinanten des Informational Lobbyings in der deutschen Tierwohlpolitik

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年1月27日

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  • Michael H. Grunenberg,
  • Christian H. C. A. Henning,
  • Johannes Ziesmer

摘要

Stable democracies seem to be characterized less by strong democratic institutions than by the ability of their elected governments to control political discourse and conduct political debates on the basis of science-based information. This puts the question of the role of informational lobbying as a strategic transfer of expertise at the center of analyses of political processes. In this context, this paper uses an Exponential Random Graph approach to analyse the importance of structural network properties as well as characteristic properties of stakeholder organizations as relevant determinants of the network-generating process using the example of German animal welfare policy. The results show that informational lobbying is a relevant channel of influence in German animal welfare policy that exhibits asymmetric influence structures in favor of traditional agricultural associations. These structures are mainly influenced by reciprocity and the embedding of information exchange in a long-term social relationship. Interestingly, they nevertheless lead to the formation of consensus rather than conflict in animal welfare policy.