<p>This paper presents a model of the interplay between a policymaker and various interest groups, viewing the incumbent as a strategic lobbyist seeking to maximize re-election chances. We assume a political context where the government has discretionary power over tax extraction and public expenditure allocation. The model predicts that the incumbent’s optimal strategy is to form a minimum winning coalition, generating systematic asymmetry by favoring specific groups while exploiting others. To test this hypothesis, we conducted a repeated-interaction experiment involving one subject as the incumbent and two others representing interest groups. The results indicate that incumbents learn to strategically differentiate between groups to secure electoral support, a behavior that contradicts the predictions of inequality aversion models which favor equal resource distribution. Furthermore, we find that this adoption of "divide-and-rule" strategies correlates with Machiavellianism, suggesting that the mechanics of political survival in this context are driven by instrumental rationality rather than social preferences.</p>