<p>The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints, concentrating strategic cargo flows and linking Gulf hydrocarbon exporters to global markets. This paper develops a transportation-security perspective on Hormuz insecurity and argues that disruption in the Strait should be understood not only as an oil-market shock, but also as a form of critical corridor insecurity affecting route reliability, cargo continuity, freight costs, insurance conditions, and macroeconomic resilience. The paper addresses a gap in the literature, where maritime chokepoint studies, resilience analysis, and oil-shock transmission are often examined separately rather than integrated into a unified corridor-security framework. It pursues two objectives: first, to formalize how exposure, mitigation, and insecurity interact in a corridor shock; and second, to test whether Hormuz-related risk indicators improve short-run forecasting performance and generate measurable responses in inflation and activity. The study combines a security-adjusted scenario model with a preliminary empirical extension based on monthly data, VARX forecasting, and local projections. The scenario analysis shows that severe insecurity can generate substantial macroeconomic damage even when partial mitigation is available. The empirical results confirm the feasibility of the workflow and the stationarity of the transformed variables, but the augmented forecasting model does not outperform the baseline specification and the full-sample estimates remain unstable. The paper concludes that the transportation-security framework is conceptually strong and policy-relevant, while the empirical evidence remains exploratory and requires stronger proxies and a longer sample before definitive predictive claims can be made.</p>