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<p>Debates on the ethical status of disembodied neural organoids (DNOs) focus on whether, and when, precautionary principles should apply given the uncertain possibility of organoid consciousness. Some advocate applying precautionary principles to DNOs despite uncertainty; others deem such measures premature given current simplicity but foresee their future necessity; while more skeptical views hold that genuinely conscious DNOs remain too remote to warrant present ethical concern. By contrast, Croxford and Bayne [1] defend a more radical skepticism, as they claim that there is little reason to ascribe consciousness not only to current DNOs, but to DNOs as such. They ground this view on a constraint-based approach composed of an Embodiment Constraint (EC) and a Representational Constraint. EC is presented as enjoying broad cross-theoretical support among externalists and internalists, and thus undermining the grounds for a precautionary ethical concern regarding DNOs. We examine EC and argue that, as stated, fails to meet the authors’ own requirement of representing a broad consensus among externalists and internalists.</p>

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Embodiment constraint: On how (not) to approach the possibility of consciousness in neural organoids

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年5月15日

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  • Ignacio Cea,
  • Mario Villalobos,
  • Abel Wajnerman-Paz

摘要

Debates on the ethical status of disembodied neural organoids (DNOs) focus on whether, and when, precautionary principles should apply given the uncertain possibility of organoid consciousness. Some advocate applying precautionary principles to DNOs despite uncertainty; others deem such measures premature given current simplicity but foresee their future necessity; while more skeptical views hold that genuinely conscious DNOs remain too remote to warrant present ethical concern. By contrast, Croxford and Bayne [1] defend a more radical skepticism, as they claim that there is little reason to ascribe consciousness not only to current DNOs, but to DNOs as such. They ground this view on a constraint-based approach composed of an Embodiment Constraint (EC) and a Representational Constraint. EC is presented as enjoying broad cross-theoretical support among externalists and internalists, and thus undermining the grounds for a precautionary ethical concern regarding DNOs. We examine EC and argue that, as stated, fails to meet the authors’ own requirement of representing a broad consensus among externalists and internalists.