<p>Many proponents of human enhancement appeal to well-being in favor of such interventions. But are arguments that prioritize well-being adequately equipped to adjudicate the use and distribution of human enhancements of the cognitive sort? I argue that well-being theories that cannot accommodate considerations of corrective justice are inadequate for adjudicating the use and distribution of neurointerventions for cognitive enhancement (CE). I demonstrate how the racialization of human cognition has generated injustices that, if left neglected, jeopardize the just distribution of neurointerventions for CE. I, then, survey the set of well-being theories currently predominant in the CE discourse, highlighting their inability to adequately accommodate considerations of corrective justice. Finally, I offer an alternative – perfectionism – capable of acknowledging both well-being and corrective justice. Ultimately, I aim, first, to encourage a shift in the CE dialogue, and second, to demonstrate that in the context of CE corrective justice is necessary for distributive justice.</p>