On the Possibility and Probability of Post-Persons: Neuroenhancements and Moral Status
摘要
Neuroenhancements have the potential to dramatically increase our intelligence, memory, motivation, and attention, to name a few ways such technology can benefit us. But can neuroenhancements increase our moral status as well? I argue in the affirmative. A higher moral status than personhood is both possible and likely given advancements in neuroenhancements. Some have argued that personhood is the highest moral status possible, so the notion of a post-person is conceptually confused. I respond by presenting an inductive argument with the conclusion that a higher moral status than personhood is both possible and likely, given the potential of neuroenhancements. While making my argument I confront the inexpressibility problem, the claim that we cannot give an account of what a higher moral status than personhood would be like. I conclude the paper with an answer to the inexpressibility challenge, by suggesting an account of a higher moral status than personhood.