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<p>In §6.54 of the <i>Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus</i>, Ludwig Wittgenstein famously claims that his work consists of nonsensical sentences. Both resolute and orthodox readers try to explain this claim, but the nonsensicality of Tractarian sentences poses a problem for the mechanism of their functioning and our understanding of them. Typically, if I understand a sentence <i>s</i>, then I entertain proposition <i>p</i>, which is expressed by the sentence <i>s</i>. However, nonsensical sentences do not express any propositions. It is also a standard assumption that if a sentence is nonsensical, then it makes no sense to talk of it as implying or entailing anything. If we understand Tractarian sentences, how is this possible? How do we understand nonsensical sentences even though they do not express propositions? The main objective of this paper is to explain the mechanism behind understanding nonsensical Tractarian sentences and how this understanding differs from understanding meaningful sentences in other philosophical works. I develop Cora Diamond’s suggestion that understanding nonsense requires an imaginative activity, and I propose interpreting imagination in terms of pretence, as is common in theories of fiction. Nonsensical sentences do not express any propositions, but we pretend that they do. Understanding a nonsensical sentence amounts to understanding the make-believe proposition expressed by this sentence. My proposal has a number of advantages: it favours neither the resolute nor the orthodox readings of the <i>Tractatus</i>; it shows that nonsense attributions are meaningful and that understanding nonsense is conceptual, and it explains the difference between understanding meaningful sentences and understanding nonsensical sentences.</p>

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Wittgenstein on the Intelligibility of the Tractatus

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年4月21日

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  • Krystian Bogucki

摘要

In §6.54 of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein famously claims that his work consists of nonsensical sentences. Both resolute and orthodox readers try to explain this claim, but the nonsensicality of Tractarian sentences poses a problem for the mechanism of their functioning and our understanding of them. Typically, if I understand a sentence s, then I entertain proposition p, which is expressed by the sentence s. However, nonsensical sentences do not express any propositions. It is also a standard assumption that if a sentence is nonsensical, then it makes no sense to talk of it as implying or entailing anything. If we understand Tractarian sentences, how is this possible? How do we understand nonsensical sentences even though they do not express propositions? The main objective of this paper is to explain the mechanism behind understanding nonsensical Tractarian sentences and how this understanding differs from understanding meaningful sentences in other philosophical works. I develop Cora Diamond’s suggestion that understanding nonsense requires an imaginative activity, and I propose interpreting imagination in terms of pretence, as is common in theories of fiction. Nonsensical sentences do not express any propositions, but we pretend that they do. Understanding a nonsensical sentence amounts to understanding the make-believe proposition expressed by this sentence. My proposal has a number of advantages: it favours neither the resolute nor the orthodox readings of the Tractatus; it shows that nonsense attributions are meaningful and that understanding nonsense is conceptual, and it explains the difference between understanding meaningful sentences and understanding nonsensical sentences.