<p>Priority Perdurantism integrates two crucial theses. The first thesis is that ordinary objects perdure. The second thesis is the middleist thesis that some composite wholes of common-sense reality – e.g., humans, cats, trees – are fundamental and their proper parts are ontologically derivative. This theory, first formulated by Skrzypek (2024), promises to combine and extend many advantages of classical perdurantism with the descriptive ontology stance inherent to the middleist view. The goal of this article is to clarify and advance Priority Perdurantism by providing adequate accounts of ordinary temporary predication. First, we develop the accounts of ordinary temporary predications sketched by Skrzypek (2024), by formulating improved and rigorous frameworks and by exploring the consequences of the resulting accounts with respect to the problem from temporary intrinsics. Second, we argue that, within these novel accounts for temporary predications, temporal parts do not play any theoretical role. Third, we formulate some motivations for Priority Perdurantism to commit to temporal parts.</p>