<p>An almost universally held view in the literature on forgiveness is that wrongdoers cannot have a right to be forgiven. I argue this claim is false. Sometimes wrongdoers have a right to be forgiven. In Section&#xa0;<InternalRef RefID="Sec3">2</InternalRef>, I show how widespread the view is that wrongdoers never have a right to be forgiven. In Section&#xa0;<InternalRef RefID="Sec4">3</InternalRef>, I present a counterexample to this widely held view, arguing that promises can ground rights to be forgiven. In Section&#xa0;<InternalRef RefID="Sec6">4</InternalRef>, I show how the case of promised forgiveness is instructive, as it points to other possible grounds for a right to forgiveness. In Section&#xa0;<InternalRef RefID="Sec8">5</InternalRef>, I consider three objections to my view. Section <InternalRef RefID="Sec12">6</InternalRef>&#xa0;concludes by considering how the existence of a right to forgiveness informs debates about what forgiveness is, arguing that it gives us reason to prefer certain kinds of views of forgiveness over others.</p>

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The Right to Forgiveness

  • Sam Ridge

摘要

An almost universally held view in the literature on forgiveness is that wrongdoers cannot have a right to be forgiven. I argue this claim is false. Sometimes wrongdoers have a right to be forgiven. In Section 2, I show how widespread the view is that wrongdoers never have a right to be forgiven. In Section 3, I present a counterexample to this widely held view, arguing that promises can ground rights to be forgiven. In Section 4, I show how the case of promised forgiveness is instructive, as it points to other possible grounds for a right to forgiveness. In Section 5, I consider three objections to my view. Section 6 concludes by considering how the existence of a right to forgiveness informs debates about what forgiveness is, arguing that it gives us reason to prefer certain kinds of views of forgiveness over others.