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<p>Can two items both be neutral in value yet differ in rank? I argue that they can, with significant implications: not everything neutral should be treated equally. This challenges the widespread assumption that neutral value marks a point of evaluative equivalence. I defend the intuitive case for neutral hierarchies through examples from aesthetics and welfare, then show that both major accounts of neutral value—comparative and non-comparative—can accommodate such hierarchies once divorced from certain theoretical commitments.</p>

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Neutral But Better: The Possibility of Null Hierarchies

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年2月12日

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  • Andrés G. Garcia

摘要

Can two items both be neutral in value yet differ in rank? I argue that they can, with significant implications: not everything neutral should be treated equally. This challenges the widespread assumption that neutral value marks a point of evaluative equivalence. I defend the intuitive case for neutral hierarchies through examples from aesthetics and welfare, then show that both major accounts of neutral value—comparative and non-comparative—can accommodate such hierarchies once divorced from certain theoretical commitments.