Scholarlink

<p>Skeptical theists criticize arguments from evil by defending skepticism about our ability to reflectively identify God’s plans for the world. Critics routinely lodge an “excessive skepticism” objection that such&#xa0;skepticism will lead to more excessive skepticism about, for instance, the external world. Recently, Perry Hendricks has defended skeptical theism from this charge by claiming that skeptical theism only undermines certain inferences, the so-called noseeum inferences. In this paper, I do three things. First, I clarify the epistemology of skeptical theistic critiques of arguments from evil. Second, I argue that, given that epistemology, Hendricks’ defense fails. Specifically, it is false that skeptical theism only undermines noseeum inferences. Lastly, I briefly suggest a superior strategy for evaluating the “excessive skepticism” objection to skeptical theism.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

The Epistemology of Skeptical Theism, Excessive Skepticism, and Hendricks’ Epistemic Gambit

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年12月3日

查看全文
  • Timothy Perrine

摘要

Skeptical theists criticize arguments from evil by defending skepticism about our ability to reflectively identify God’s plans for the world. Critics routinely lodge an “excessive skepticism” objection that such skepticism will lead to more excessive skepticism about, for instance, the external world. Recently, Perry Hendricks has defended skeptical theism from this charge by claiming that skeptical theism only undermines certain inferences, the so-called noseeum inferences. In this paper, I do three things. First, I clarify the epistemology of skeptical theistic critiques of arguments from evil. Second, I argue that, given that epistemology, Hendricks’ defense fails. Specifically, it is false that skeptical theism only undermines noseeum inferences. Lastly, I briefly suggest a superior strategy for evaluating the “excessive skepticism” objection to skeptical theism.