Causalism about action explains what an action is in terms of its causes. Causalism about free action explains what a free action is in terms of its causes. Carolina Sartorio (2023) suggests that they add up into ‘big-picture causalism’. This paper develops an even bigger-picture causalism. The central addition comes from the distinction between structural and substantive rationality. The problem of the disappearing agent is raised for Sartorio’s causalism about action, and a solution based on dispositions of structural rationality is presented. However, such dispositions are neither necessary nor sufficient for free action. As Sartorio suggests, we should rather appeal to a disposition of substantive rationality or reasons-responsiveness (and some extra qualifications) to capture free action. But by combining the two types of rationality, we capture a broader range of types of control than Sartorio—and develop an even bigger-picture causalism that features action, free action, and rational action.
