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<p>In this reply paper, I address three objections that were raised against the goal-directed theory of emotions (Moors <CitationRef CitationID="CR16">2022</CitationRef>). The first objection questions the appropriateness of aligning all emotions, including positive ones, with decision-making processes. The second objection challenges the theory’s ability to account for the valence aspect of all positive and negative emotions, highlighting two sets of counterexamples. The third objection asserts that the theory fails to give a satisfactory account of the irrational flavor of certain emotions, in particular recalcitrant ones.</p>

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How the Goal-Directed Theory of Emotions Can Account for Valence and Irrationality: Reply to Objections

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年4月7日

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  • Agnes Moors

摘要

In this reply paper, I address three objections that were raised against the goal-directed theory of emotions (Moors 2022). The first objection questions the appropriateness of aligning all emotions, including positive ones, with decision-making processes. The second objection challenges the theory’s ability to account for the valence aspect of all positive and negative emotions, highlighting two sets of counterexamples. The third objection asserts that the theory fails to give a satisfactory account of the irrational flavor of certain emotions, in particular recalcitrant ones.