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<p>Parfit (2011, 2017) denies that committing to the existence of reasons is ontologically costly. To motivate his denial, Mintz-Woo (2018) thinks Parfit forwards two arguments: the plural senses argument from elimination and the argument from empty ontology. Mintz-Woo believes he has “debunked” both arguments. In what follows, we do three things. First, we argue that his objections to the arguments fail or at best miss the point. Second, we argue that even if our independent responses fail, his responses meet an unfortunate dilemma. Lastly, we address his concerns about the relationship between Parfit’s ontology and truth.</p>

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In Defense of Parfit’s Ontology

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年2月22日

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  • Evan Jack,
  • Mustafa Khuramy

摘要

Parfit (2011, 2017) denies that committing to the existence of reasons is ontologically costly. To motivate his denial, Mintz-Woo (2018) thinks Parfit forwards two arguments: the plural senses argument from elimination and the argument from empty ontology. Mintz-Woo believes he has “debunked” both arguments. In what follows, we do three things. First, we argue that his objections to the arguments fail or at best miss the point. Second, we argue that even if our independent responses fail, his responses meet an unfortunate dilemma. Lastly, we address his concerns about the relationship between Parfit’s ontology and truth.