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<p>Buck-passing analyses of normative concepts in terms of normative reasons face the so-called ‘wrong kind of reason’ (WKR) problem. Most work on this topic has focused either (i) on the WKR problem for the buck-passing account of value or (ii) more generally as an issue for ‘reasons fundamentalists’ (those that hold that <i>all</i> normative concepts can be analysed into normative reasons). This paper concerns the buck-passing analysis of <i>deontic</i> concepts, in particular the concept of <i>wrongness</i>, understood as an analysis into normative reasons for action. I first address the question of whether wrong kind reasons for action are possible in the first place, before examining and rejecting some accounts of the WKR/RKR for action. I end with a suggestion which points to a positive account of the distinction, and I explain one way in which appealing to this distinction can help to resolve the WKR problem.</p>

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Deontic Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年3月6日

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  • Euan Metz

摘要

Buck-passing analyses of normative concepts in terms of normative reasons face the so-called ‘wrong kind of reason’ (WKR) problem. Most work on this topic has focused either (i) on the WKR problem for the buck-passing account of value or (ii) more generally as an issue for ‘reasons fundamentalists’ (those that hold that all normative concepts can be analysed into normative reasons). This paper concerns the buck-passing analysis of deontic concepts, in particular the concept of wrongness, understood as an analysis into normative reasons for action. I first address the question of whether wrong kind reasons for action are possible in the first place, before examining and rejecting some accounts of the WKR/RKR for action. I end with a suggestion which points to a positive account of the distinction, and I explain one way in which appealing to this distinction can help to resolve the WKR problem.