<p>This article examines why South Korea has failed to consolidate civilian control of its military despite decades of democratic development, illustrated by the 2024 martial law crisis. While scholarship often assumes robust civilian control in South Korea's mature democracy, we explain why the disconnect between formal democratic institutions and substantive civilian oversight has persisted for three decades. Building on Trinkunas’s framework, distinguishing between civilian control by containment and oversight, we extend this model by analyzing how transitional justice processes shape regime leverage and by reconsidering Huntington's objective control concept within the South Korean context. Through a case study spanning from democratization to the present, we demonstrate that South Korea successfully contained military intervention in politics but failed to develop civilian defense expertise necessary to progress to oversight. This failure created enduring vulnerabilities that allowed civilian leaders to privatize military power for partisan purposes. Our analysis reveals how formal democratic institutions without substantive civilian defense expertise can mask persistent civil-military weaknesses even in seemingly consolidated democracies. By illuminating the mechanisms through which civilian control can stagnate at the containment level, this study advances our understanding of democratic consolidation and highlights blind spots in democratization approaches that privilege electoral development over substantive civilian control.</p>