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<p>Conventional wisdom in bureaucratic politics suggests that subnational officials with local ties are more vulnerable to the influence of social elites and less compliant with central policies. In this paper, we question this view and propose a more nuanced relationship between local embeddedness and bureaucratic compliance in China. It argues that, when a centrally mandated policy has high political priority and could adversely affect certain local interests, bureaucrats with stronger local ties may face greater suspicion of obstructing its implementation. To avoid scrutiny and protect themselves from punishment, they are incentivized to enforce such policies more intensely. We test this theory using city-level data from China’s National Crackdown on Gang Crimes (2018–2020), a campaign targeting organized criminal groups and their obscure connections to local officials. The findings show that prefecture-level city leaders with stronger ties to their assigned localities made more aggressive efforts to prosecute organized crime members. Our study offers unique insights into how local embeddedness shapes bureaucratic behavior: the fear of being perceived as complicit may drive localized officials to “overcompensate” in implementing central mandates.</p>

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The Anxiety of Embedded Officials: Local Ties and Bureaucratic Compliance During China’s Anti-Gang Crackdown (2018–20)

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年4月2日

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  • Jingyuan Qian,
  • Feng Tang

摘要

Conventional wisdom in bureaucratic politics suggests that subnational officials with local ties are more vulnerable to the influence of social elites and less compliant with central policies. In this paper, we question this view and propose a more nuanced relationship between local embeddedness and bureaucratic compliance in China. It argues that, when a centrally mandated policy has high political priority and could adversely affect certain local interests, bureaucrats with stronger local ties may face greater suspicion of obstructing its implementation. To avoid scrutiny and protect themselves from punishment, they are incentivized to enforce such policies more intensely. We test this theory using city-level data from China’s National Crackdown on Gang Crimes (2018–2020), a campaign targeting organized criminal groups and their obscure connections to local officials. The findings show that prefecture-level city leaders with stronger ties to their assigned localities made more aggressive efforts to prosecute organized crime members. Our study offers unique insights into how local embeddedness shapes bureaucratic behavior: the fear of being perceived as complicit may drive localized officials to “overcompensate” in implementing central mandates.